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Non-technical Summary
In this study we want to assess the attractiveness of Germany compared to the other EU-member
states as a business location for US multinational investors. In a broader context we want to analyse
impact of the corporate tax systems of the 15 EU-member states on the investment and the financing
decision of an US multinational corporation. Therefore, the tax burden at the level of the subsidiary,
the US parent, and the US shareholders has to be considered separately.
The calculation of the tax burdens is based on the commonly used approach of King and Fullerton
which was extended in certain aspects. With the King-Fullerton-model effective marginal tax rates
(EMTR) are calculated. Although this approach (as any model) has several well known limitations
the main advantages of the model are besides the high international acceptance (e.g. the model is
used in studies commissioned by the European Commission and the OECD) its versatility and the
possibilities it offers to model the most relevant provisions of the tax codes, enabling the user to ana-
lyse the effects of different tax systems in a very systematic way.
We refer to a typical manufacturing company which is characterised by a particular combination of
investments and forms of finance. We considered five different types of investment: intangibles, in-
dustrial buildings, machinery, financial assets and inventories. The financing policy considered three
sources of finance: new equity capital, retained earnings, and debt.
The calculations took into account the most relevant tax provisions. Relating to company taxation,
we considered the corporation tax systems, other (local) profit taxes and non-profit taxes, the tax
rates, and the most relevant aspects of the tax base (e.g. depreciation rules and valuation of invento-
ries). Moreover, the treatment of different types of investment income was taken into account (e.g.
dividends, interest income and capital gains).
The results considering the level of the subsidiaries have shown that there is a great variation among
the EMTR in the EU-member states. For our manufacturing company EMTR range from 12.36
(Greece) to 39.32 p.c. (France). The ranking of the countries from the highest to the lowest EMTR
above all is influenced by differences between the (effective) rates of corporation tax (including local
profit taxes and surcharges). However, on average there is only a minor impact of the tax base (i.e.
rules for computing taxable income).
The analysis referring to the level of the US parent and of the US shareholders has shown, that
differences between the effective tax burden in the EU-member states can distort decisions of a US
multinational company with respect to the cross-border financing and location of investment within
the EU. In general those countries with low national EMTR are more attractive as business location
than countries with higher national EMTR.
Considering the source of finance of the subsidiary, debt financing is in the majority of cases most
efficient whereas profit retention in the subsidiary is due to taxation of capital gains in the US indeed
the worst tax strategy.
With respect to the present tax law, Germany stands only on 13th position in the country ranking of
the EMTR. If the reform proposals for the year 2000 or later were carried out (e.g. reduction of
statutory tax rate on profits to 35 p.c. and cut back of depreciation allowances) Germany would
improve its position in the country ranking and range close to the average EMTR of all EU-member
states. Moreover, the reform proposal are likely to have an impact both on investment patterns (e.g.
deterioration of depreciable assets) and financing decisions (e.g. new equity would then be more tax
efficient than debt financing) of US parents in Germany.
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11 Introduction
It is an established fact that the tax burden of companies located in different EU member states
differs from country to country.1 However, the impact of the national tax differentials on the decision
of multinational companies, with respect to the financing and the location of investment within the EU
is not that clear, as cross-border investment results in a more complex tax position than purely
domestic investment. The aim of this paper then is to calculate the effective tax burden of US
inbound investment in Germany, taking into consideration the recent changes in the German tax law
(Steuerentlastungsgesetz 1999/ 2000/ 2002) as well as the proposals for reforming company
taxation in the year 2000 or thereafter (chapter 3). Moreover, the attractiveness of Germany as a
business location for subsidiaries of US multinationals compared to other EU-member states is also
analysed by establishing a country ranking of the tax positions (chapter 4). Thereafter, chapter 5 will
look at the conclusions. Firstly however, the assumptions and the methodology are discussed
(chapter 2).
2 Assumptions and methodology
The calculation of effective tax burdens for cross-border investment of a US corporation in all EU-
member states closely follows the commonly used approach of King and Fullerton2 for the
calculation of effective marginal tax rates.3 The effective marginal tax rate (EMTR) is defined as the
difference between the pre-tax real return (p) on a marginal investment and the post-tax real return
(s) of the supplier of finance divided by the pre-tax real return (p).
EMTR
p s
p
=
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Marginal investments are projects which yield a rate of return on the initially invested capital (equal to
one unit) that is just sufficient that the project is from the investor’s point of view worthwhile. For the
computation of EMTR it is necessary to specify a starting point. This could be either the pre-tax real
return of the company (p) or the pre-tax real return of the supplier of finance. In this paper an
uniform pre-tax real return for all projects at a rate of 10 per cent is employed.4
The calculations of cross-border EMTR are based on the following assumptions:
- A parent company resident in the United States of America makes an investment through a
subsidiary located in each of the 15 EU-member states.
- The shareholding of the parent in the subsidiary is 100 per cent, thus only direct cross-border
investment is considered (and no transnational portfolio investment).
- The private individual shareholder of the US-parent company (portfolio investor) resides in the
same country as the parent (e.g. in the USA).
                                                                
1 See for example SPENGEL / ECKERLE (1999).
2 See KING / FULLERTON (1984).
3 International studies of the OECD and the European Commission also applied this methodology. See
COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (1992); OECD (1991). See also CLAASSEN (1994);
CHENNELLS / GRIFFITH (1997); CARON & STEVENS / BAKER & MCKENZIE (1999). For an evaluation of dif-
ferent methodological approaches see OECD (1999); SPENGEL / ECKERLE (1999).
4 Our procedure is commonly denoted as the fixed-p case. Studies using the so-called fixed-r case are
COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (1992); OECD (1991); CHENNELLS / GRIFFITH (1997). For
both cases see KING / FULLERTON (1984).
2- As taxation differs from the assets and the financing possibilities, EMTR depends upon the
proportion of the marginal investment in each type of asset and the proportion of the company
financing in each source of finance. Thus, EMTR depends upon the particular industry and
sector respectively as each industry can be characterised by a particular combination of assets
and sources of finance. As investment of the subsidiary we examine five different assets:
intangibles acquired from third parties, industrial buildings, machinery, financial assets and
inventories.
- The financing policy of the subsidiary and the parent respectively considers three sources of
finance: new equity capital, retained earnings, and debt.
- The source of finance of the investment in the subsidiary disregards the possibility of the
subsidiary to raise funds at its local or even international capital markets. Instead, the investment
is financed only by retained earnings of the subsidiary, by the injection of new equity from the
parent in the subsidiary or by lending money from the parent to the subsidiary.
- In each case, the parent itself needs to raise funds, which it could do as in the domestic context
by issuing new equity, retained earnings, or borrowing money from its own shareholders.
- There is complete repatriation of the profits of the subsidiary to the parent. In the event of new
equity financing, we assume a full distribution of profits (dividends); in the event of financing with
retained earnings we assume that the return at the level of the shareholder will be generated by a
capital gain upon disposal of the shares; in the event of debt financing we assume that the return
at the level of the company is fully used to pay the interest to the shareholder.
Figure 1:
Combinations of types of assets and sources of finance in the case of US cross-border investment
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Under these assumptions, profits resulting from the investment may be taxed at three different levels.
First, taxation takes place at the level of the subsidiary. Second, profits may be taxed at the level of
the parent when they are repatriated from the subsidiary to the parent company. Third, personal
taxes may be paid by individual shareholders of the US-parent company. The following calculations
and analysis clearly distinguishes between these three levels.
The tax burden at each level depends on how the investment is financed at the level of the subsidiary
and how the parent itself is financed in order to provide the subsidiary with money. Considering new
3equity financing, financing by retained earnings, and debt financing at the level of both the subsidiary
and the parent, nine financing possibilities have altogether to be examined. If we combine these
financing possibilities with five types of asset at the level of the subsidiary this results in 45 possible
combinations of asset and financing as set out in figure 1. In addition, keeping the comparison of
EMTR for all countries still manageable, we calculate mean (weighted average) EMTR for each type
of asset, each source of finance, and an overall mean EMTR for all combinations of assets and
financing.5
As taxation differs from the assets and the financing possibilities, the above EMTR essentially depend
upon the proportion of the marginal investment in each type of asset and the proportion of the
company financing in each source of finance. Thus, EMTR depends upon the particular weights for
the assets and the financing possibilities. For the sake of comparison of the effects solely attributable
to the different national tax codes the same weights have to be used for all 15 EU-member states.6
We took data from official German statistics. The last year available was 1995. As a base case we
consider data for the manufacturing sector:
- The weights for the assets of the subsidiary are 1.43 p.c. for intangibles, 12.99 p.c. for buildings,
17.49 p.c. for machinery, 38.25 p.c. for financial assets, and 29.84 p.c. for inventories.7
- For the sources of finance of the subsidiary we took statistical data concerning the cross-border
financing of German subsidiaries of US parent companies in the manufacturing sector. The
weights are 29 p.c. for new equity, 33 p.c. for retained earnings, and 38 p.c. for debt.8 For the
sources of finance of the US parent we use the same weights.
Finally, the calculation of EMTR has to consider both tax and economic variables as input data.
Table 1: Most important assumptions of the calculations
Assumptions about sector, assets, financing, and shareholders
Sector Manufacturing sector as base case
Types of asset of subsidiary (weights in p.c.)
Intangibles (1.43), industrial buildings
(12.99), machinery (17.49), financial assets
(38.25), inventories (29.84)
Sources of finance of subsidiary and parent (weights in p.c.)
New equity (29), retained earnings (33), debt
(38)
Shareholders
Private investors, top personal tax rates,
(portfolio investment)
Assumptions about depreciation, inflation, and pre-tax return
True economic depreciation (always straight-line)
Intangibles
12.5 years
Buildings
53 years
Machinery
11 years
Lifetime for tax purposes where no year is specified 10 years 25 years 7 years
Inflation rate 1.1 per cent
Pre-tax real return 10 per cent
Taxation: Attention is given to the most relevant tax provisions. Relating to company taxation, we
consider corporation tax and the corporation tax systems, other (local) profit taxes and non-profit
                                                                
5 The methodology for calculating EMTR is set out with worked examples in CARON & STEVENS / BAKER &
MCKENZIE (1999), Annex A and D; OECD (1991), p. 207-243.
6 See AUERBACH (1990), p. 326; KING / FULLERTON (1984), p. 281; OECD (1991), p. 94-95.
7 See DEUTSCHE BUNDESBANK (1997).
8 DEUTSCHE BUNDESBANK (1999). These weights differ from those of the purely domestic sources of finance.
Taking again Germany as an example the weights are 10 p.c. for new equity, 55 p.c. for retained earnings, and
35 p.c. for debt. See DEUTSCHE BUNDESBANK (1997).
4taxes, the tax rates, and the most relevant aspects of the tax bases9 (e.g. depreciation rules and
valuation of inventories). The study uses information about the tax systems in operation as of the 1st
January 1999.10 Several assumptions have to be made with respect to the use of tax electives and
the tax position of the private investors. Concerning the use of tax electives (e.g. depreciation) we
always take the most tax efficient possibility (e.g. declining-balance instead of straight-line). With
respect to private investors we assume that they are always taxable with their income at top rates.
Furthermore, we consider rules for non-qualified private investors (e.g. portfolio investments) only.
Economic data: The EMTR for the type of assets will differ because of different capital allowance
rates for tax purposes relative to the true economic depreciation rates and because of inflation. Our
assumptions about the rates of true economic depreciation were taken from international surveys.11
The inflation rate in use is 1.1 p.c., which was the actual rate in Germany in the year 1998.12 Finally,
EMTR will depend upon the assumption about the pre-tax return (p) which is an indicator for the
profitability of the investment. For our base case we fix p at a rate of 10 p.c.
3 Taxation of US inbound investment in Germany
3.1 The situation in Germany as from 1999
3.1.1 Level of the German subsidiary
In order to give access to the interpretation of EMTR we refer to the situation in Germany as from
1999 as a detailed example.13
Table 2:
EMTR with a 10 per cent pre-tax real return in Germany 1999 - level of German subsidiary -
Asset Intangibles Buildings Machinery Financial
Assets
Inventories Weighted
average
Finance
New Equity 30.92 42.48 35.48 46.70 46.70 43.96
Retained Earnings 38.24 48.58 42.32 52.35 52.35 49.90
Debt -17.13 2.47 -9.39 9.63 9.63 4.99
Weighted average 15.08 29.29 20.69 34.48 34.48 31.11
Table 2 shows the results for the level of the German subsidiary. It should be interpreted as follows:
For an investment in financial assets, yielding a given pre-tax real return of 10 p.c. and financed by
retained earnings, the EMTR is 52.35 p.c. Thus, EMTR equals the German statutory tax rate on
profits14 which is not surprising as no depreciation is allowed for financial assets. Taking financial
assets as a benchmark, we observe that for machinery, financed in the same way, the EMTR is
about ten percentage points lower and thus also lower as the statutory tax rate. The reason is that
capital allowances on machinery for tax purposes are higher than the estimated true economic
depreciation due to the shorter lifetime of the asset (7 years for taxation instead of 11 years) as well
                                                                
9 Thin capitalisation rules at the level of the subsidiary are neglected in the case of debt financing.
10 If not otherwise indicated relevant information was taken from INTERNATIONAL BUREAU OF FISCAL
DOCUMENTATION (1999); JACOBS (1999a), p. 116-135.
11 See LEIBFRITZ (1989), p. 161.
12 See DEUTSCHE BUNDESBANK (1998), Statistischer Teil, p. 7. No attention is given to differing exchange rates.
Referring to European Monetary Union the assumption seems to be reasonable.
13 See ENDRES / DITSCH (1999), p. 26-40 for a brief description of the Ge rman tax system.
14 Corporation tax (SCT, 40 p.c.), solidary levy on CT (SSL, 5.5 p.c.), trade tax on income (STT, 17.59 p.c. for an
average municipal levy for 1999 of 426 p.c.). With respect to the deductibility of trade tax from the corpora-
tion tax base the statutory tax rate for profits equals 52.35 p.c. (STT + SCT * (1 + SSL) * (1 - STT)).
5as to the application of declining-balance (30 p.c.) instead of straight-line depreciation. This results in
a tax saving due to „accelerated“ deduction of the costs of capital from the tax base. EMTR for
intangibles is lowest which indicates generous depreciation practice in Germany Intangibles are
assumed to be depreciable for tax purposes over five years instead of an estimated period of true
economic depreciation of 12.5 years. For buildings the depreciation practice in Germany is also
generous (25 compared with 40 years) as the EMTR is below the statutory tax rate on profits.
Nevertheless, EMTR is highest of all depreciable assets. This can be attributed to land tax
(Grundsteuer) which is an extra levy on an investment in buildings. Finally, turning to inventories, the
EMTR also equals the statutory tax rate. In Germany we assume inventories are valued on a „last in
first out“ basis which eliminates a taxable inflationary gain with regard to the assumptions of the King-
Fullerton model.
If the corporation financed the same investments by new share capital (i.e. new equity), EMTR
would be lower for all assets. The reason is the split corporation tax rate in Germany which will be
reduced to 30 p.c. for distributed profits (i.e. dividends) instead of 40 p.c. for retained earnings.
However, this tax rate reduction is compensated by the levy of a withholding tax on dividends of 5
p.c. according to article 10 paragraph 2a of the US/German Double Tax Treaty.
In contrast, if the investments were debt-financed, EMTR would be close to zero for all investment.
The reason is, that in the case of borrowing, interest is deductible form the tax base with its nominal
value. For investment in financial assets just yielding the market pre-tax return interest deduction at
the same rate results in the absence of discriminating taxes in a EMTR equal to zero. However,
EMTR on debt financed financial assets is positive due to the levy of trade tax on the half of the
interest paid. On the other hand, the combination of interest relief and high capital allowances can
result in an effective subsidy of marginal investments. In the case of Germany this is true for
investments in intangibles and machinery.
In summary, EMTR for investment in intangibles is lowest while EMTR for financial assets and
inventories are highest. This is also obvious from the weighted average effective marginal tax rates we
calculate in addition to the 15 EMTR. We compute weighted average rates for assets by summing up
all EMTR that involve a particular asset multiplied by the weight of each source of finance (29 p.c.
for new equity, 33 p.c. for retained earnings, and 38 p.c. for debt).15 Turning to finance, from the
weighted average rates for sources of finance it can easily be seen that debt financing is subject to the
lowest EMTR regardless of the precise asset. In spite of the levy of trade tax on half of the interest
payments the weighted average EMTR on debt financing is close to zero due to interest deduction
and generous depreciation allowances. We compute weighted average rates for sources of finance
by summing up all EMTR that involve a particular financing possibility multiplied by the weight of
each asset (1.43 p.c. for intangibles, 12.99 p.c. for buildings, 17.49 p.c. for machinery, 38.25 p.c.
for financial assets, and 29.84 p.c. for inventories).16 Overall, across all 15 asset and finance
combinations, the weighted average effective marginal tax rate of the given German subsidiary
amounts to 31.11 p.c.
                                                                
15 For example weighted average EMTR for machinery (20.69 p.c.) is the sum of EMTR/ machinery/ new equity
* weight new equity (35.48 * 29 p.c. = 10.29 p.c.), EMTR/ machinery/ retained earnings * weight retained
earnings (42.32 * 33 p.c. = 13.98 p.c.), and EMTR/ machinery/ debt * weight debt (-9.39 * 38 p.c. = -3.58 p.c.).
16 For example weighted average EMTR for new equity (43.96 p.c.) is the sum of EMTR/ intangibles/ new equity
* weight intangibles (30.92 * 1.43 p.c. = 0.44 p.c.), EMTR/ buildings/ new equity* weight buildings (42.48 *
12.99 p.c. = 5.51 p.c.), EMTR/ machinery/ new equity * weight machinery (35.48 * 17.49 p.c. = 6.21 p.c.),
EMTR/ financial assets/ new equity * weight financial assets (46.70 * 38.25 p.c. = 17.86 p.c.), and EMTR/ in-
ventories/ new equity * weight inventories (46.70 * 29.84 p.c. = 13.94 p.c.).
63.1.2 Level of the US parent
If we only consider the level of the subsidiary, debt-financing is always more tax-efficient than fi-
nancing by new shares issue and profit retention, respectively. However, in order to compare all
forms of finance in an adequate manner, and hence, to decide whether a subsidiary should be fi-
nanced by retention, new equity, or debt, the analysis must include the taxation of profit repatriation
at the level of the parent (e.g. taxation of inter-company dividends, interest, and capital gains at the
US parent).17 We first assume that the parent finances the costs of the investment in the subsidiary by
new equity or profit retention. Refinancing with debt is considered in a subsequent step.
- Debt financing: Interest payments from a foreign subsidiary are subject to US corporation tax.
- New equity: Foreign source dividends are taxable in the USA. In order to avoid double taxation
on dividends from foreign subsidiaries in the case of qualified participation a credit will be granted
not only in respect of a withholding tax on dividends but also in respect of the underlying profit
taxes paid by the subsidiary (indirect foreign tax credit).18 The indirect foreign tax credit is limited
to the US corporation tax on the grossed-up dividend income. Depending on the level of the for-
eign compared to the US tax burden on dividends the final burden on dividends will therefore be
either the foreign tax paid (excess foreign tax credit) or the higher US tax on the taxable dividend
income. In case of an excess foreign tax credit foreign source dividends are effectively exempted
from further US taxation (exemption method in principle).
- Profit retention: Capital gains upon the disposal of shares from the subsidiary are fully subject to
corporation tax in the United States.
If the parent uses debt for refinancing the investment in the subsidiary the connected interest costs are
always deductible in the United States. The reason is that interest, dividends and capital gains are
taxable in the USA (capital export neutrality).
Considering now the accumulated tax burden of the foreign subsidiary and the parent we obtain the
following results reference given to the different forms of financing (see table 3).
Table 3:
EMTR with a 10 per cent pre-tax real return in Germany 1999 - level of US parent -
Finance of
subsidiary
Finance of parent Intangibles Buildings Machinery
Financial
Assets
Inventories
Weighted
average
New Equity 30.92 42.48 35.48 46.70 46.70 43.96
New Equity Retained Earnings 30.92 42.48 35.48 46.70 46.70 43.96
Debt -6.28 11.50 0.74 18.00 18.00 13.79
New Equity 63.71 70.42 66.36 72.88 72.88 71.29
Retained earnings Retained Earnings 63.71 70.42 66.36 72.88 72.88 71.29
Debt 44.17 54.50 48.25 58.27 58.27 55.83
New Equity 21.30 34.04 26.33 38.70 38.70 35.68
Debt Retained Earnings 21.30 34.04 26.33 38.70 38.70 35.68
Debt -21.07 -1.47 -13.33 5.69 5.69 1.05
Weighted average 25.42 37.96 30.37 42.54 42.54 39.57
                                                                
17 For the taxation of international investment income in the United States see ENDRES / SPENGEL (1997), p. 83-
93. No respect is given to states’ taxes which usually exempt foreign source income.
18 E.G. German corporation tax and trade tax on corporate income paid on the dividends can be credited against
US corporation tax (article 23 paragraph 1 of the US/German Double Tax Treaty). See also DEBATIN / ENDRES
(1990), p. 389-395. The fact, that the foreign (e.g. German) income has to determined according to the US rules
is neglected.
7As the US statutory corporation tax rate (35 p.c.) is lower compared to the German statutory tax
rate on distributed profits including 5 p.c. withholding tax on dividends (46.7 p.c.) from the point of
view of a US parent debt financing in general is the most tax efficient way of financing. The reason is
that profits shifted through debt financing from the subsidiary to the parent are (besides trade tax on
income in Germany on half of the interest) only taxable at the level of the parent. Therefore, the lower
US corporation tax rate is relevant for the EMTR. A further advantage results from the fact that in
the case of inflation the tax saving of interest deduction in Germany is higher than the tax burden on
interest in the USA.19 Due to the full taxation of capital gains upon the disposal of shares in the USA
retention of profits in a German subsidiary is taxed twice: statutory rate on retained earnings in Ger-
many and corporation tax in the USA. As profit retention bears already the highest EMTR in Ger-
many this financing strategy therefore is always worst from a tax point of view. EMTR on distributed
profit is between the two other ways of financing. As the tax burden on distributed profits in Ger-
many is higher than the US corporation tax, no further tax has to be paid by the US parent resulting
in an actual exemption of dividends from German subsidiaries.
In case the US parent itself is debt-financed there is no explicit limitation as to the deduction of the
connected interest costs from the corporation tax base. Thus, interest deduction does not result in a
specific tax saving with respect to the different forms of financing at the level of the subsidiary.
Overall, across all 45 asset and finance combinations, the weighted average effective marginal tax
rate of the given German subsidiary at the level of the US parent amounts to 39.57 p.c.
3.1.3 Level of the US shareholder
So far, the tax implications of the investment and the financing of a German subsidiary were only
analysed up to the level of the US parent not considering the level of the US shareholders. This might
be sufficient in the case of a multinational corporation with only little connection to its (anonymous)
shareholders. However, this analysis is neglecting at least the effect of the corporation tax system on
the financing of the parent by its own shareholders. Moreover, the EMTR on the overall level is rele-
vant for a medium-sized corporation with close relations to its shareholders.
Table 4:
EMTR with a 10 per cent pre-tax real return in Germany 1999 - level of US shareholder -
Finance of
subsidiary
Finance of parent Intangibles Buildings Machinery
Financial
Assets
Inventories
Weighted
average
New Equity 67.13 73.46 69.63 75.78 75.78 74.28
New Equity Retained Earnings 52.89 61.28 56.20 64.34 64.34 62.36
Debt 43.51 53.25 47.36 56.81 56.81 54.50
New Equity 85.09 88.77 86.55 90.12 90.12 89.25
Retained earnings Retained Earnings 76.68 81.56 78.61 83.34 83.34 82.18
Debt 71.14 76.80 73.38 78.87 78.87 77.53
New Equity 61.86 68.84 64.62 71.39 71.39 69.74
Debt Retained Earnings 45.92 55.16 49.57 58.54 58.54 56.35
Debt 35.41 46.14 39.65 50.06 50.06 47.52
Weighted average 58.61 66.09 61.56 68.82 68.82 67.05
Looking at table 4 for the overall level we can observe that the overall weighted average effective
marginal tax rate is rising from 39.57 to 67.05 per cent. The reason is that investment returns are
taxed in the hands of the shareholders independent of the source of finance. However, the EMTR
                                                                
19 See in general FULLERTON (1984), p. 33; FULLERTON (1986), p. 286; GRAVELLE (1985), p. 104.
8depends on whether we consider interest income (debt financing), dividends (new equity) or capital
gains (profit retention at the level of the parent).
In the case of debt financing by the parent interest income of the shareholder is fully taxable at the
top personal rate. We assume a rate of 45.22 p.c. including federal income tax of 39.6 p.c. plus
state income tax of California. We can see from table 4 that the lowest weighted average EMTR
results if both the German subsidiary and the US parent were debt-financed. In this situation the
„profits“ of the German subsidiary are - except trade tax on half of the interest expenses - only tax-
able in the hands of the US shareholders at their personal income tax rates.
The highest EMTR result from new equity financing. Under the US classical corporation tax system
dividends are subject to full income tax at a rate of 45.22 p.c. This causes an economic double taxa-
tion as the underlying profits have already been subject to corporation tax at the level of the German
subsidiary. As profit retention in Germany bears a higher effective tax burden compared with divi-
dend distribution the financing policy bearing the highest EMTR is profit retention in Germany and
new share issue in the USA (89.25 p.c.).
In the case of retained earnings the realised capital gain on the accumulated profits in the corpora-
tion upon disposal of the shares is taxable at a reduced rate of 27.44 p.c. (20 p.c. plus state income
tax of California). Thus, economic double taxation of profits is reduced compared with dividend
distribution but not eliminated if we consider debt financing as the benchmark.
In summary, it seems reasonable to conclude, that both the German and the US tax system as well as
the interaction of these two systems distort investment and financing decisions in many ways. The
most tax efficient investment in a German subsidiary is a intangible due to generous capital allow-
ances. Considering the source of finance it is obvious that debt financing is most efficient and profit
retention in Germany is the worst tax strategy. Both tax systems favour debt financing compared to
new equity regardless of whether we take the level of the subsidiary, the level of the parent or the
overall level. However, the reasons for the preferential treatment of debt financing is different for
each of the three level. For the level of the subsidiary it is the German trade tax on income that allows
interest costs to be deducted to the extend of 50 p.c. At the level of the US parent it is the lower US
statutory tax rate on profits compared with the one in Germany that causes preferential treatment of
debt financing. Finally, at the level of the shareholders the classical corporation tax leads to a higher
tax burden on dividends and capital gains.
3.2 Effects of recent changes and proposals for reforming company taxation in
Germany
The tax amendment act for the years 1999/ 2000/ 2002 was passed in the German Parliament in
spring 1999. The purpose of the tax changes that came into force on January 1st 1999 was a modest
reduction of personal income tax rates and a reduction of the corporation tax rate on retained earn-
ings from 45 p.c. to 40 p.c. The corporation tax rate for distributed profits remained unchanged.
These tax rate reductions were largely financed by cut backs of tax incentives, a long list of disal-
lowing certain expenses altogether from deduction, changes in tax accounting that lead to a deferral
of the tax deductibility of much expenditure until nearer the time it is actually incurred, and strict limi-
tations of tax-free step-ups in case of mergers and acquisitions.
9Although there are a lot of tax changes many of them seem relevant and seem to have a negative
impact for foreign companies investing in Germany20 the calculation model applied in this paper can
only consider the reduction of the corporation tax rate on retained earnings. The most striking conse-
quences of this tax rate reduction on the financing decision of a US corporation investing in Germany
through a subsidiary can be seen from table 5.
- Considering the effects on all types of assets and sources of finance the overall average EMTR in
1999 compared with 1998 are slightly lower on all three levels (e.g. subsidiary, parent, and
shareholder).
- The reduction of the overall EMTR is caused by the reduction of the corporation tax rate on re-
tained earnings. As a result, profit retention in the German subsidiary becomes more attractive
relative to the two other ways of financing. The lower EMTR on retained earnings is a definitive
gain and becomes obvious on all three levels. However, for US investors or foreign investors in
general this benefit is not of much practical importance as the two other ways of financing still
bear a significantly lower EMTR.
- This reduction of the overall average EMTR is compensated by a higher average EMTR on debt-
financed investment. The reason is the lower benefit of interest deduction in Germany due to the
reduction of the corporation tax rate on retained earnings.21
- As the corporation tax rate on distributed profits does not change there is almost no impact on the
average EMTR on new equity. What can be observed is a little rise of the EMTR on all three lev-
els.
- Compared with 1998 the little higher average EMTR on new equity in 1999 is caused by minor
increases of the EMTR of the depreciable assets. These increases are the result of lesser tax sav-
ing through accelerated depreciation due to the reduction of the corporation tax rate on retained
earnings.
Table 5:
Weighted average EMTR with a 10 p.c. pre-tax real return in Germany for sources of finance assuming investment
mix in the subsidiary (intangibles (1.43 p.c.), industrial buildings (12.99 p.c.), machinery (17.49 p.c.), financial
assets (38.25 p.c.), inventories (29.84 p.c.)) - 1999 and tax reform proposal -
German subsidiary US parent US shareholder
Weighted average types of assets 1998 1999 reform 1998 1999 reform 1998 1999 reform
Intangibles 14.82 15.08 12.18 24.40 25.42 24.24 58.00 58.61 57.91
Buildings 29.84 29.29 26.46 37.68 37.96 36.87 65.92 66.09 65.44
Machinery 21.20 20.69 19.38 30.04 30.37 30.61 61.36 61.56 61.71
Financial assets 35.95 34.48 25.35 43.09 42.54 35.86 69.15 68.82 64.85
Inventories 35.95 34.48 25.35 43.09 42.54 35.86 69.15 68.82 64.85
Weighted average source of finance
Finance of
subsidiary
Finance of parent
New Equity 43.80 43.96 37.35 74.19 74.28 70.65
New Equity Retained Earnings 43.80 43.96 37.35 43.80 43.96 37.35 62.24 62.36 57.56
Debt 13.53 13.79 3.61 54.36 54.50 48.93
New Equity 74.09 71.29 60.98 90.78 89.25 83.60
Retained earnings Retained Earnings 54.21 49.90 34.05 74.09 71.29 60.98 84.22 82.18 74.79
                                                                
20 See ENDRES / DITSCH (1999), p. 89-99 for an overview and comments.
21 The reduction of the corporation tax rate has two effects that cause a rise of the EMTR in the case of debt
financing: First it lowers the gains of accelerated depreciation (e.g. the net present value of depreciation) and
second it causes a rise of the effective (and definitive) burden of the German trade tax.
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Debt 60.14 55.83 39.97 79.89 77.73 68.85
New Equity 33.96 35.68 39.55 68.80 69.74 71.86
Debt Retained Earnings 4.44 4.99 5.79 33.96 35.68 39.55 55.10 56.35 59.15
Debt -1.60 1.05 7.00 46.07 47.52 50.78
Overall weighted average 32.28 31.11 24.26 39.84 39.57 34.93 67.21 67.05 64.28
The final stage of the reform should be a uniform and linear tax rate of not more than 35 p.c. to be
levied on all business profits regardless of the legal form or the distribution policy. This „business tax“
should cover both corporation income tax and trade tax on income. The details of this last step of the
reform have not yet been drafted. However, a group of experts on company taxation has worked
out a concept22 of a „business tax“ with several aspects still to be discussed in autumn 1999/ spring
2000. The main features of this concept are, as already mentioned, a significantly lower tax rate on
profits and the abolition of the corporation tax imputation system. Instead double taxation of distrib-
uted profit should be mitigated at the shareholder level by deducting half of the dividend income re-
ceived for the purpose of income tax (so-called shareholder relief).23 It is intended that part of the tax
rate reductions are - besides the positive revenue effects of the abolition of the imputation system - to
be financed by a further „broadening“ of the tax base. It seems reasonable to conclude that such a
change of the corporation tax system and the tax rates will have fundamental consequences for the
German tax system.24 For foreign companies investing in Germany, however, the change of the cor-
poration tax system has only a minor effect.
On the other hand, the tax rate reductions as well as the tax base broadening have an immediate
impact on the tax burden of a German subsidiary and are therefore more relevant.25 In order to as-
sess the effect of the main features of the proposed tax changes on the EMTR the following calcula-
tions are based on the following assumptions:
- Implementation of a uniform tax rate on profits of 35 p.c. (corporation tax of 25 p.c. plus trade
tax on income of 10 p.c. effectively). The 35 p.c. mark the statutory tax rate on retained earnings,
for distributed profits the statutory tax rate rises to 38.25 p.c. assuming that the 5 p.c. withholding
tax on dividends will still be levied according to the US/German Double Tax Treaty. The statutory
(trade) tax rate on interest expenses will fall to 7.14 p.c.
- A cut back in the depreciation rules is considered both for machinery (declining balance only 20
instead of 30 p.c.) and buildings (straight-line depreciation over 33 instead of 25 years).
The effects on the EMTR for a US investor are also shown in table 5. With respect to the overall
weighted average EMTR we can observe a decrease on all three levels if we compare the reform
scenario with the situation of 1999. However, the tax rate reductions have different impacts on the
weighted average EMTR for the different sources of finance.
- At the level of the German subsidiary the EMTR on retained earnings is falling significantly from
49.9 to 34.05 p.c. Moreover, with respect to the 5 p.c. withholding tax on dividends this would
result in a EMTR on new equity of 37.35 p.c. thus being lower than in 1999 by about six per-
                                                                
22 See BRÜHLER EMPFEHLUNGEN ZUR REFORM DER UNTERNEHMENSBESTEUERUNG (1999).
23 If a corporation receives (domestic and foreign) dividends these are exempted from corporation tax
(participation exemption).
24 See HEY (1999), p. 1192-1198; WAGNER / BAUR / WADEN (1999), p. 1296-1300; SCHIFFERS (1999), p. 741-747;
SPENGEL / VITUSCHEK (1999), for a first analysis of the reform proposals.
25 A short assessment of the reform proposals on international inbound and inbound investors is given by
MENCK (1999), p. 561-563.
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centage points.26 Finally, EMTR on debt financing, however, would rise from 4.99 to 5.79 p.c. as
the tax savings due to depreciation became less.
- If we move to the level of the US parent we can see that now, in contrast to the previous years,
new equity would be the most tax efficient way of financing. As there is still a situation of excess
tax credit there is no further tax payment of the parent. Compared with new equity financing, the
reform would result in a higher EMTR on debt financing as the statutory tax rate on dividends
(38.25 p.c.) would be less than the statutory tax rate on interest that faces the US parent (39.64
p.c. = 7.14 p.c. trade tax in Germany plus 32.5 p.c.27 corporation tax in the USA). As the re-
duced statutory German tax rate on profits leads to decreasing tax savings caused by depreciation
EMTR on debt financing after the reform would even be higher than at present. Although profit
retention will be taxed significantly lower after the reform at the level of the subsidiary it is still the
worst strategy from a tax point of view as capital gains are taxed again at the level of the US par-
ent.
- Shifting to the level of the US shareholder there is no change in the most tax efficient way of fi-
nancing the German subsidiary (e.g. debt is inferior to equity financing). However, as long as we
have the classical corporation tax systems in the USA, US shareholders should still finance there
corporation with debt instead of new equity from a tax point of view.
Finally, with regard to the taxation of different investment projects, the EMTR for the types of as-
sets in table 5 show that the relative taxation of depreciable assets (e.g. intangibles, buildings, and
machinery) in comparison with financial assets (and inventories) is becoming worse over time. The
tax reform concepts in Germany could therefore discourage, instead of encourage, real investment in
the future.28 Taking EMTR for buildings as an example we can see that in 1998 EMTR for financial
assets was about six percentage points higher (35.95 compared to 29.84 p.c.) while after the pro-
posed reform the EMTR for financial assets would be about one percentage point less (25.35 com-
pared to 26.46 p.c.). The reason is that all assets whether or not depreciable or productive would
benefit from the tax rate reductions over time. This already leads to a relative deterioration of depre-
ciable assets as the present value of tax savings due to capital allowances is falling. Moreover, the
said deterioration is even rising because of the tax base broadening and the cut back of depreciation
practise respectively.
3.3 Summary
Taking a time span of three years the German tax policy shows a clear trend towards a lowering of
tax rates combined with extending the tax base through a reduction in the (net present) value of al-
lowances for depreciable assets. This development is in line with the tax policies in other major in-
dustrialized countries29 beginning with the USA in 1986. Although the overall EMTR for a typical mix
of assets and sources of finance is decreasing over time, the effects of this tax policy on the stimula-
tion of new investment and the attractiveness of Germany as a business location for US multinational
investors is not clear. The questionable impact on new investment stems from the deterioration in the
                                                                
26 Thus, we cannot confirm the conclusion that the tax burden on new equity will rise due to the reform. See
MENCK (1999), p. 562 for this conclusion that only seems to respect the corporation tax rate (30 p.c. at
present) and to neglect the effect of the trade tax that is included in the upper ceiling of the business tax rate
of 35 p.c.
27 E.g. 35 p.c. on an interest 92.86 p.c. after deducting German trade tax of 7.14 p.c.
28 See in general SCHNEIDER (1992), p. 665-669; SINN / LEIBFRITZ / WEICHENRIEDER (1999), p. 16; SPENGEL
(1994), p. 10-11; WAGNER (1999), p. 1522, 1527.
29 See CHENNELLS / GRIFFITH (1997), p. 3-5.
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taxation of depreciable assets relative to financial assets. Whether Germany becomes more attractive
as a business location for foreign investors is not an exclusive question of the overall EMTR. If we
look at the EMTR for the different sources of finance we can see that EMTR on debt financing is
rising while EMTR both on retained earnings and distributed profits are falling. With respect to the
financing of a German subsidiary of an US investor new equity even becomes more tax efficient than
debt. Therefore, the US investor should think over the financing structure of his German subsidiary if
he used debt as the predominant source of financing in the past. However, what is clear from the
results shown in table 5 is that the most tax efficient financing structure will bear a higher effective tax
burden after the reforms than before.30 This could prevent some investors from investing in Germany,
if there were better alternatives. The results are summed up in figures 2-4 considering new equity,
profit retention, and debt financing at the level of the subsidiary but only new equity refinancing at the
level of the parent.
                                                                
30 E.g. at the level of the parent EMTR for new equity after the refrom is 37.35 p.c. whereas EMTR for debt was
33.96 p.c. in 1998. See table 5.
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Figure 2:
EMTR with a 10 p.c. pre-tax real return in Germany assuming investment mix in the subsidiary and only new eq-
uity refinancing of the US parent (see table 5 for the numbers) - 1998 -
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Figure 3:
EMTR with a 10 p.c. pre-tax real return in Germany assuming investment mix in the subsidiary and only new eq-
uity refinancing of the US parent (see table 5 for the numbers) - 1999 -
Fehler! Kein gültiges eingebettetes Objekt.
Figure 4:
EMTR with a 10 p.c. pre-tax real return in Germany assuming investment mix in the subsidiary and only new eq-
uity refinancing of the US parent (see table 5 for the numbers) - reform -
Fehler! Kein gültiges eingebettetes Objekt.
An interesting (and intended?) side effect of the reform is that the tax revenues in Germany are ex-
pected to rise. This holds at least for existing investment structures if the US investors act accordingly
and change their financing policy from debt to equity. The reason is that profits in the case of equity
financing are taxed in the source country (i.e. Germany = state of the subsidiary) whereas interest in
the case of debt financing is taxed in the state of residence of the investor (i.e. USA = state of resi-
dent of the parent).
4 Taxation of US inbound investment in Europe
Finally, the attractiveness of Germany as a business location of US multinationals compared to other
EU-member states is analysed by establishing a EU-wide country ranking of the tax positions. The
results for the level of the EU-subsidiaries, the US parent and the US shareholders are shown in
tables 6-8 with respect given to the German tax changes and reform proposals. Concerning the
weights for the assets and sources of finance, the calculations are based on the same assumptions as
in the case of Germany (see table 1, chapter 2 for the weights).
For the level of the subsidiaries31 we see from the final column in table 6 that the EU-average over-
all EMTR is about 23 p.c. The highest EMTR can be found in France (39 p.c.). Overall EMTR be-
low 20 p.c. are calculated for five countries (Finland, Greece, Ireland, Italy, and Sweden), the value
for Greece (12 p.c.) being the lowest. Thus, we have an EU-wide spread of about 27 percentage
points. This EU-wide spread cannot be explained by just one feature of the national tax systems but
as a general rule it can be stated that countries having a high statutory tax rate on profits (such as
                                                                
31 See CARON & STEVENS / BAKER & MCKENZIE (1999), Chapter C for a detailed analysis.
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France, Spain, and Germany) also show high effective tax burdens for retained earnings while coun-
tries with low statutory tax rates on profits often go along with low effective tax burdens (for example
Finland and Sweden).
Table 6: Effective marginal tax rates - US-cross-border-investment in Europe - Level of subsidiary
Average of each source of finance
(assuming investment mix in the subsidiary- intangibles (1.43 p.c.), industrial buildings (12.99 p.c.),
machinery (17.49 p.c.), financial assets (38.25 p.c.), inventories (29.84 p.c.)) Overall
Source of finance subsidiary New Equity Retained Earnings Debt average
Austria 41.13 38.03 6.10 26.79
Belgium 40.97 37.86 -3.86 22.91
Denmark 37.74 34.47 0.71 22.59
Finland 31.43 27.82 -0.25 18.20
France 53.47 51.02 18.36 39.32
Germany 1998 43.80 54.21 4.44 32.28
Germany 1999 43.96 49.90 4.99 31.11
Germany reform 37.35 34.05 5.79 24.26
Greece 27.25 27.25 -11.93 12.36
Ireland 29.21 29.21 1.68 18.75
Italy 30.93 27.29 -0.50 17.78
Luxembourg 41.15 38.05 -4.14 22.92
Netherlands 38.43 35.19 0.29 22.87
Portugal 38.97 35.76 -2.63 22.10
Spain 48.96 43.28 12.75 33.32
Sweden 30.63 26.98 -1.42 17.24
United Kingdom 31.58 31.77 2.52 20.60
Average (Germany 1998) 37.71 35.88 1.47 23.34
Average (Germany 1999) 37.72 35.59 1.51 23.26
Average (Germany reform) 37.28 34.54 1.56 22.80
Table 7: Effective marginal tax rates - US-cross-border-investment in Europe - Level of parent
Average of each source of finance
(assuming investment mix in the subsidiary- intangibles (1.43 p.c.), industrial buildings (12.99 p.c.),
machinery (17.49 p.c.), financial assets (38.25 p.c.), inventories (29.84 p.c.))
Source of finance subsidiary New Equity Retained Earnings Debt
Source of finance parent New
Equity
Retained
Earnings
Debt New
Equity
Retained
Earnings
Debt New
Equity
Retained
Earnings
Debt Overall
average
Austria 41.13 41.13 9.42 63.57 63.57 43.95 39.13 36.13 6.36 37.09
Belgium 40.97 40.97 9.18 63.46 63.46 43.78 31.54 31.54 -5.32 33.51
Denmark 37.74 37.74 4.22 61.25 61.25 40.39 35.63 35.63 0.96 33.38
Finland 35.90 35.90 1.39 56.93 56.93 33.74 35.90 35.90 1.39 31.15
France 53.47 53.47 28.41 72.01 72.01 56.94 46.02 46.02 16.95 47.91
Germany 1998 43.80 43.80 13.53 74.09 74.09 60.14 33.96 33.96 -1.60 39.84
Germany 1999 43.96 43.96 13.79 71.29 71.29 55.83 35.68 35.68 1.05 39.57
Germany reform 37.35 37.35 3.61 60.98 60.98 39.57 39.55 39.55 7.00 34.93
Greece 33.77 33.77 -1.89 56.56 56.56 33.17 27.25 27.25 -11.93 26.29
Ireland 37.16 37.16 3.33 57.84 57.84 35.13 37.16 37.16 3.33 32.52
Italy 30.93 30.93 -6.27 56.59 56.59 33.21 34.32 34.32 -1.04 28.55
Luxembourg 41.15 41.15 9.46 63.58 63.58 43.98 31.88 31.88 -4.80 33.78
Netherlands 38.43 38.43 5.27 61.72 61.72 41.11 35.19 35.19 0.29 33.61
Portugal 38.97 38.97 6.10 62.09 62.09 41.68 32.87 32.87 -3.28 32.88
Spain 48.96 48.96 21.47 66.98 66.98 49.21 43.28 43.28 12.75 43.08
Sweden 35.15 35.15 0.22 56.39 56.39 32.90 35.15 35.15 0.22 30.32
United Kingdom 37.22 37.22 3.42 59.50 59.50 37.69 37.43 37.43 3.73 33.33
Average (Germany 1998) 39.65 39.65 7.15 62.17 62.17 41.80 35.78 35.78 1.20 34.48
Average (Germany 1999) 39.66 39.66 7.17 61.98 61.98 41.51 35.90 35.90 1.38 34.46
Average (Germany reform) 39.22 39.22 6.49 61.30 61.30 40.43 36.15 36.15 1.77 34.16
Table 8: Effective marginal tax rates - US-cross-border-investment in Europe - Overall level
Average of each source of finance
(assuming investment mix in the subsidiary- intangibles (1.43 p.c.), industrial buildings (12.99 p.c.),
machinery (17.49 p.c.), financial assets (38.25 p.c.), inventories (29.84 p.c.))
Source of finance subsidiary New Equity Retained Earnings Debt
Source of finance parent New
Equity
Retained
Earnings
Debt New
Equity
Retained
Earnings
Debt New
Equity
Retained
Earnings
Debt Overall
average
Austria 72.72 60.30 52.11 85.02 76.58 71.03 71.63 58.85 50.43 65.57
Belgium 72.64 60.18 51.98 84.96 76.50 70.93 67.47 53.34 44.03 63.44
Denmark 71.61 58.83 50.41 84.26 75.58 69.86 70.48 57.33 48.67 64.25
Finland 69.86 56.51 47.71 81.36 71.77 65.43 69.86 56.51 47.71 62.02
France 79.48 69.25 62.51 89.64 82.71 78.14 75.40 63.85 56.23 72.02
Germany 1998 74.19 62.24 54.36 90.78 84.22 79.89 68.80 55.10 46.07 67.21
Germany 1999 74.28 62.36 54.50 89.25 82.18 77.73 69.74 56.35 47.52 67.05
Germany reform 70.65 57.56 48.93 83.60 74.79 68.85 71.86 59.15 50.78 64.28
Greece 68.69 54.96 45.91 81.18 71.50 65.12 65.12 50.23 40.41 59.13
Ireland 70.55 57.42 48.77 81.88 72.43 66.20 70.55 57.42 48.77 62.85
Italy 67.14 52.90 43.52 81.19 71.52 65.14 69.00 55.36 46.38 60.47
Luxembourg 72.74 60.32 52.13 85.03 76.60 71.04 67.66 53.59 44.32 63.60
Netherlands 71.24 58.34 49.84 84.01 75.24 69.47 69.47 55.99 47.11 63.49
Portugal 71.54 58.73 50.29 84.21 75.51 69.78 68.20 54.31 45.15 63.06
Spain 77.01 65.98 58.71 86.89 79.06 73.91 73.91 61.87 53.93 69.14
Sweden 69.45 55.96 47.07 81.08 71.37 64.97 69.45 55.96 47.07 61.53
United Kingdom 70.58 57.47 48.82 82.79 73.63 67.60 70.70 57.61 48.99 63.32
Average (Germany 1998) 71.96 59.29 50.94 84.29 75.61 69.90 69.85 56.49 47.68 64.07
Average (Germany 1999) 71.97 59.30 50.95 84.18 75.48 69.76 69.91 56.57 47.78 64.06
Average (Germany reform) 71.73 58.98 50.58 83.81 74.99 69.16 70.05 56.76 48.00 63.88
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Table 9 shows the statutory tax rates on profits (corporation tax and other profit taxes when levied)
and the EMTR for retained earnings in the EU-member states. EMTR above the statutory tax rates
are caused by the levy of non-profit taxes others than land tax (e.g. Austria, France, and Luxem-
bourg) or by comparably restrictive rules for profit computation (e.g. UK). On the other hand,
EMTR noticeably below the statutory tax rates express comparably generous rules for profit com-
putation (e.g. Belgium, Greece) or preferential tax rates for certain types of income (e.g. Italy).
EMTR for new equity are in general higher than EMTR on retained earnings. Thus, profit retention at
the level of the subsidiary seems more favourable than distributing income to the parent. However,
one has to bear in mind that capital gains upon the disposal of shares are fully taxable in the USA
whereas profit taxes on distributed income can be credited against US corporation tax. At the level
of the subsidiary the higher EMTR for new equity relative to retained earnings result from the levy of
withholding taxes according to the provisions of the double tax treaties of the EU-member states with
the USA (except Greece and Italy).32 In Germany (1998 and 1999) and the UK, however, the
EMTR for new equity is lower. In Germany this can be explained by the split rate corporation tax
system that is unique in Europe.33 In the UK one half of the tax credit subject to a deduction of 5 p.c.
of the dividend and half the tax credit is granted to US inbound (direct) investors according to the
provisions of the US/ UK double tax treaty.34 This subsidy qualifies for a relatively small repayment
in the case of profit distribution.
Table 9:
Statutory tax rate on profits and EMTR for retained earnings in the EU-member states - level of subsidiary -
Country Statutory tax rate
on retained
earnings
EMTR for
retained earnings
Statutory tax rate
on distributed
profits
EMTR for
distributed profits
Austria 34.00 38.03 37.30 41.13
Belgium 40.17 37.86 43.16 40.97
Denmark 34.00 34.47 37.30 37.74
Finland 28.00 27.82 31.60 31.43
France 40.00 51.02 43.00 53.47
Germany 1998 56.70 54.21 46.85 43.80
Germany 1999 52.35 49.90 46.70 43.96
Germany reform 35.00 34.05 38.25 37.35
Greece 35.00 27.25 35.00 27.25
Ireland 28.00 29.21 28.00 29.21
Italy 41.25 27.29 44.19 30.93
Luxembourg 37.45 38.05 40.58 41.15
Netherlands 35.00 35.19 38.25 38.43
Portugal 37.40 35.76 40.53 38.97
Spain 44.75 43.28 50.27 48.96
Sweden 28.00 26.98 31.60 30.63
United Kingdom 30.00 31.77 29.81 31.58
From the point of view of the subsidiary, debt financing is treated far most generously, resulting in an
EU-average EMTR of about 1.5 p.c. only. If interest payments were fully deductible one would
                                                                
32 See INTERNATIONAL BUREAU OF FISCAL DOCUMENTATION (1999), for the withholding taxes.
33 See JACOBS (1999b), p. 265-268, for an overview of the European corporation tax systems.
34 See GAMMIE (1998), p. 433-435 for details.
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expect an EMTR for debt equal to zero. However, limitation of full interest deduction outside the
scope of thin capitalization rules (e.g. trade tax in Germany and Spain) and/ or the levy of high non-
profit taxes (e.g. France) can result in a positive EMTR whereas no limitation of interest deduction
combined with very generous rules for profit computation result in negative EMTR expressing a sub-
sidy of debt-financed investment (e.g. above all Greece).
Turning to the level of the US parent we see from the final column in table 7 that the average EMTR
is rising from 23 p.c. to about 34 p.c. French subsidiaries bear the highest overall EMTR (48 p.c.)
while overall EMTR below 30 p.c. exist for Greek and Italian subsidiaries. The spread of the EMTR
amounts to 19 percentage points and is lower than at the level of the subsidiaries (27 percentage
points). Explanation is given by the fact that all returns from investment are taxable at the level of the
US parent.
Profit retention in the subsidiary bears the highest EMTR for investment in all EU-member states
because of full taxation of capital gains upon the disposal of shares in the USA. This results in a dou-
ble taxation of the retained earnings.
Above all, the decrease of the spread of the overall EMTR can be explained by the US taxation of
foreign dividends. Due to the indirect foreign tax credit these dividends are taxed at least with the US
corporation tax rate. Therefore, distributed profits in the case of equity financing and interest income
in the case of debt financing should in principle bear the same tax burden. However, the results in
table 7 show that average EMTR for new equity is higher than for debt financing. The reason is the
limitation of the indirect foreign tax credit to the US corporation tax on the grossed-up dividend.
Consequently, in the case of excess foreign tax credit the higher tax level of the country of residence
of the subsidiary becomes relevant. On the other hand, countries that have compared with the US
corporation tax rate a lower EMTR on distributed profits (e.g. new equity) loose part of their ad-
vantage relative to other countries as the higher US tax rate is relevant (e.g. Finland, Greece, Ireland,
Italy, Sweden, and the UK). But EMTR for new equity and debt at the level of the US parent is only
equal for subsidiaries in those countries with lower EMTR that do not tax either new equity nor debt
preferentially (e.g. Finland, Ireland, and Sweden).
Finally, looking at table 8 which shows the EMTR for the overall level, we see from the final column
that the average overall EMTR is about 64 p.c. and the spread is decreasing to 13 percentage
points. France still is the country with the highest EMTR (72 p.c.) whereas Greece is the country
with the lowest EMTR (59 p.c.). The average numbers in the last three rows of table 8 make clear
that except for German, Italian and UK subsidiaries debt financing of foreign subsidiaries is in princi-
ple also more tax efficient than equity financing from the point of view of the US shareholders. Profit
retention bears the highest overall EMTR. Considering the tax optimal financing of a US parent
through its domestic shareholders debt financing is best and new equity financing worst.
After all, assessing the attractiveness of Germany as a business location for US multinationals in the
European Union, we can see for all three levels (e.g. subsidiary, US parent, and US shareholder)
that Germany stands on 13th position in 1998 and 1999. It would move to 12th position if the reform
took place. Although this is only an improvement by one position in the country ranking, overall
EMTR for investment in a German subsidiary would be very close to average. Thus we can conclude
that on the one hand, the reform would improve the competitiveness of Germany significantly. On the
other hand, however, Germany would not become a tax haven at all (see figures 5-7).
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Figure 5: Overall EMTR with a 10 p.c. pre-tax real return assuming typical investment and financing mix
- level of subsidiary (see table 6 for the numbers) -
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Figure 6: Overall EMTR with a 10 p.c. pre-tax real return assuming typical investment and financing mix
- level of US parent (see table 7 for the numbers) -
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Figure 7: Overall EMTR with a 10 p.c. pre-tax real return assuming typical investment and financing mix
- level of US shareholder (see table 8 for the numbers) -
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5 Conclusion
In this study we wanted to assess the attractiveness of Germany compared to the other EU-member
states as a business location for US multinational investors. In order to do this we had to analyze the
effective tax burdens for the level of the subsidiary, the US parent, and the US shareholders sepa-
rately.
The calculation of effective marginal tax rates (EMTR) was based on the commonly used approach
of King and Fullerton which was extended in certain aspects. We referred to a typical manufacturing
company which is characterised by a particular combination of investments and forms of finance. We
considered five different types of investment: intangibles, industrial buildings, machinery, financial
assets and inventories. The financing policy considered three sources of finance: new equity capital,
retained earnings, and debt.
The calculations took into account the most relevant tax provisions. Relating to company taxation,
we considered the corporation tax systems, other (local) profit taxes and non-profit taxes, the tax
rates, and the most relevant aspects of the tax base (e.g. depreciation rules and valuation of invento-
ries). Moreover, the treatment of different types of investment income was taken into account (e.g.
dividends, interest income and capital gains).
The results considering the level of the subsidiaries have shown that there is a great variation among
the EMTR in the EU-member states. For our manufacturing company EMTR range from 12.36
(Greece) to 39.32 p.c. (France). The ranking of the countries from the highest to the lowest EMTR
above all is influenced by differences between the (effective) rates of corporation tax (including local
profit taxes and surcharges). However, on average there is only a minor impact of the tax base (i.e.
rules for computing taxable income).
The analysis referring to the level of the US parent and of the US shareholders has shown, that
differences between the effective tax burden in the EU-member states can distort decisions of a US
multinational company with respect to the cross-border financing and location of investment within
the EU. In general those countries with low national EMTR are more attractive as business location
than countries with higher national EMTR.
Considering the source of finance of the subsidiary, debt financing is in the majority of cases most
efficient whereas profit retention in the subsidiary is due to taxation of capital gains in the US indeed
the worst tax strategy.
With respect to the present tax law, Germany stands only on 13th position in the country ranking of
the EMTR. If the reform proposals for the year 2000 or later were carried out (e.g. reduction of
statutory tax rate on profits to 35 p.c. and cut back of depreciation allowances) Germany would
improve its position in the country ranking and range close to the average EMTR of all EU-member
states. Moreover, the reform proposal are likely to have an impact both on investment patterns (e.g.
deterioration of depreciable assets) and financing decisions (e.g. new equity would then be more tax
efficient than debt financing) of US parents in Germany.
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